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THERE ARE plenty of alarming signs indicating a possible farm 
crisis: current corn prices are half 
the 2013 peak level of US $7/bushel; 
farm income has declined for major 
commodities (corn, wheat, cattle), 
falling from the previous year to levels 
well below recent years; weak farm 
income and worsening credit conditions 
continue to trim farmland values, 
which are expected to trend lower in 
the months ahead, thus weakening the 
equity position of producers and the 
collateral value for lenders. Given the 
heightening farm ϐinancial crisis, many 
agricultural lenders, academics, and 
other stakeholders in the US farm sector 
worry another farm crisis is looming. 
However, there are four economic and 
legal reasons why this farm downturn is 
unlikely to slide into a sudden collapse 
of agricultural markets.
Reason 1: Much stronger, real 
income accumulation before the 
current downturn
When debunking or conϐirming the 
idea of a farm crisis replay, it is useful 
to closely investigate the previous farm 
crises of the 1920s and 1980s, and it’s 
equally important to investigate the 
golden eras before them. Through that 
comparison, I argue that the much 
stronger income accumulation during 
the late 2000s, fueled by growing export 
demand from China, historically low 
interest rates, and the expanding biofuel 
market, puts agricultural producers and 
businesses a much better condition now 
to weather storms.
Table 1 presents the average annual 
percentage change in inϐlation-adjusted 
Iowa land values, gross and net farm 
income for the three golden eras, and 
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farm downturns. While it is concerning 
to see that since 2013 gross and net 
cash income has decreased 4.5 percent 
and 9.8 percent per year, respectively, it 
is equally important to note that from 
2003 to 2013, gross and net income 
consistently grew 4.5 percent and 8.1 
percent every year, reaching almost 
record-high levels in both farm income 
and land values. Forecasted income 
for 2017 by USDA-Economic Research 
Service seems to suggest that farm 
income is stabilizing for Corn Belt states 
like Iowa.
A comparison between this third 
golden era and the two previous reveal 
that farmers accumulated much more 
income, especially cash, during the most 
recent decade than during the 1910s and 
1970s before those farm crises. Net cash 
income before the 1980s farm crisis is 
actually much smaller, even though land 
values skyrocketed during the same time. 
In other words, high commodity prices 
in the 2000s seem to have positioned 
agricultural producers nowadays to 
withstand the current headwinds.
Reason 2: Historically low
interest rates
Put simply, land value is the net present 
value of all discounted future income 
ϐlows. With certain assumptions 
imposed, one could think of land value 
being net income divided by interest 
(discount) rate. 
Low interest rates are favorable 
to keep the farmland market aϐloat: on 
the one hand, it encourages stronger 
loan demand due to lower interest 
payments, and on the other hand, low 
interest rates also signals that the 
returns for other competing assets, 
such as stocks and bonds, aren’t so 
robust that farmland investors are 
willing to accept a lower rate of return. 
Figure 1 reveals that even with recent 
hikes, interest rates are still very 
low compared to the 1980s, and the 
Federal Reserve is likely to raise the 
interest rate at a slow pace as opposed 
to a sudden hike, which makes loan 
restructuring possible for producers 
wanting to take advantage of current 
favorable interest rates. 
Table 1. Average Annual Percentage Change in Infl ation-adjusted 
Iowa Land Values and Farm Income
Note: The average land value change from 2013 to 2017 is approximate because 2017 land values are 
unknown. The 1910–1933 gross and net farm income changes are for the whole United States due to 
limited data at the state level. Land values are based on USDA Census of Agriculture and USDA NASS 
Land Value and Cash Rent Survey, while the data on farm income is from the USDA Economic Research 
Service Farm Income and Wealth Statistics database.
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Figure 2 speciϐically compares 
the average cash rent and annual 
mortgage payments per acre for a 
typical Iowa farmland loan under 
prevailing farmland loan interest rates 
and varying terms.1 It shows that due 
to abnormally high interest rates in 
the 1980s, the mortgage payment for 
a typical farmland loan was almost 
three times higher than the typical cash 
rent, and extending the farmland loan 
repayment schedules from 15 to 30 
years did almost nothing to alleviate the 
ϐinancial burden faced by landowners. 
However, under today’s low interest 
rate environment, debt restructuring 
is feasible and makes sense: under 
current prevailing farmland loan rates, 
extending a farmland loan from a 15 to 
30-year repayment schedule would cut 
the annual mortgage payment needed 
from over $350 per acre—higher than 
the 2016 cash rent of $230—to a level 
comparable to the typical cash rent. In 
fact, many lenders are now advising 
their clients to take advantage of the 
current favorable interest rates to secure 
repayment capacity. 
Reason 3: More prudent agricultural 
lending in part driven by more 
stringent regulations
The most striking aspect of the 1970s 
land boom during this high-inϐlation 
era is that debt capital largely ϐinanced 
the massive investment in agricultural 
assets. One reason is that loan 
requirements by lenders like Farmers 
Home Association were fairly lenient—it 
was not uncommon for agricultural 
lenders to give out large-cap loans up to 
80 or even 85 percent of the collateral 
value. What made it worse was the way 
collateral value was calculated—market 
value unadjusted for inϐlation, which 
means that the book value of collateral 
rose when inϐlation skyrocketed. Figure 
2 shows that both factors, in addition to 
high interest rates, contributed to the 
staggering agricultural debt and highly 
 Figure 1. Iowa Farmland Value and Farmland Loan Interest Rates 1969-2016
Figure 2. Cash Rent and Annual Mortgage Payments for Iowa Farmland 
Loans Under Prevailing Interest Rates
Figure 3. The Agricultural Liquidity, Profi tability and Solvency Ratios for the 
U.S. 1960 – 2016
Source: Farmland value data is from Iowa State University land value survey and the farmland loan 
interest rate is from the Federal Reserve bank at Chicago.
Source: Farmland value data is from Iowa State University land value survey (Zhang 2017), cash 
rent data is from the ISU cash rent survey, and the farmland loan interest rate is from the Federal 
Reserve bank at Chicago. 
Source: USDA Economic Research Service Farm Income and Wealth Statistics. Please use the right 
y-axis titles for the two dashed lines: total rate of return on farm assets, and debt to asset ratio.
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United States since 1960, and Figure 
4 shows agricultural loan delinquency 
rates since 1970. Although the current 
rate is rising, it is still well below the 
1980s farm crisis level. The proϐitability 
ratio, such as rate of return on farm 
assets, is now inching down, but is also 
higher than the 1980s levels. It is likely 
that with the current stagnation of 
commodity prices and continued decline 
in farm income, the debt service ratio 
will continue to rise and the proϐitability 
ratio remain ϐlat or decrease. However, 
it is more likely a liquidity and working 
capital problem, as opposed to a solvency 
problem. The balance sheet of the US 
farm sector is still very strong, which 
can be seen from the low level of debt to 
asset ratio in Figure 3. Similarly, although 
we see in Figure 4 the loan repayment 
index continued to decline, but the 
delinquency rates for both agricultural 
loans in general, as well as farmland 
loans, are still at very low levels.
Reason 4: Stronger government 
safety net
It is very important to point out the 
strength of the agricultural safety 
net—in 1987, only 50 million acres in 
the entire United States were insured 
in the Federal Crop Insurance program. 
Today, just the total cropland insured 
in Iowa exceeds 25 million acres, 
representing 93% of Iowa’s corn and 
soybean production acres (USDA RMA 
2015, for more information please see 
Crop Insurance in Iowa, http://www.
card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_review/
display.aspx?id=26). There is arguably 
stronger support from the livestock 
insurance program as well. In addition, 
payments from federal and state 
commodity programs and disaster relief 
programs provide signiϐicant revenue 
and price protection. The 1980s farm 
crisis represents the failure of the 
government’s safety test in the ‘stress 
leveraged agricultural sector. By 1978, 
the debt incurred averaged 76 percent 
of the purchase price, and between 1970 
and 1980, the amount of farm mortgage 
debt increased 59 percent. 
After the 1980s farm crisis, the 
regulations on agricultural lending 
limits got tighter, and agricultural banks 
reverted to a 65 percent loan-to-value 
ratio, which became an even more 
stringent 50 percent loan-to-value ratio 
after the 2007–2008 ϐinancial crisis. 
Nowadays, one more factor helps limit 
the amount of debt and leverage faced 
by the US agricultural sector—collateral 
value is often calculated using a cash 
ϐlow approach, as opposed to inϐlated 
market value. For example, in 2012 even 
though corn prices are approaching 
$7/bushel, the long-term average price 
of $4/bushel is often used by lenders 
like Farm Credit Service in calculating 
collateral value. 
Lower interest rates and more 
prudent lending practices deϐinitely help 
agricultural producers manage debts 
now. Figure 3 shows the agricultural 
liquidity and solvency ratios for the 
Figure 4. The Agricultural Loan Repayment Index and Delinquency Rates 
1970-2015
Source: Federal Reserve Bank (2017).
 Figure 5. Crop Insurance Coverage for U.S. 1986-2016
Continued on page 10
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test,’ however, agricultural producers 
and the farm sector in general now have 
a much stronger safety net compared to 
the 1980s.
Despite the deteriorating 
agricultural ϐinancial conditions and 
continued decline in farm income, 
the current farm downturn is more 
likely a liquidity and working capital 
problem, as opposed to a solvency 
and balance sheet problem for the 
entire agricultural sector. Rather than 
an abrupt farm crisis, we are likely 
experiencing a gradual, drawn-
out downward adjustment to the 
historical normal return levels for the 
agricultural economy.  
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Redistribution or Public Good: 
Which Direction for the New Farm Bill?
continued from page 6
Another frequent argument made 
for farm subsidies is that farming is 
a risky business and all that stands 
between a farmer and ϐinancial ruin 
are farm subsidies and the crop 
insurance program. Stam and Dixon 
(2002) showed that farm bankruptcy 
rates were only high in the 1930s 
and the mid-1980s, periods of severe 
ϐinancial stress in the farm sector. The 
annual rate of bankruptcy in the 1930s 
peaked at about 0.13 percent. In the 
mid-1980s the rate of bankruptcies 
was higher at 0.25 percent. Data on 
current bankruptcy rates are not 
readily available, but bankruptcy rates 
outside these two periods of extreme 
ϐinancial stress are below 0.03 percent. 
It is tempting to use this statistic to 
conclude that more than 99.97 percent 
of farm payments do not prevent 
bankruptcy, but it cannot be known 
for certain whether bankruptcy rates 
would be higher or lower without farm 
programs, outside periods of severe 
ϐinancial stress. Sufϐice it to say that 
outside periods of severe ϐinancial 
distress, the vast majority of farm 
payments do not prevent bankruptcy. 
A desire to protect farmers from 
ϐinancial stress is clearly a motivating 
factor for some supporters of farm 
payments. But such protection can be 
counter-productive because ϐinancial 
stress serves the economic purpose 
of signaling farmers that they need to 
change what they are doing. Response to 
market signals is what makes capitalism 
work. Current farm payment formulas 
use either ϐixed prices or past market 
prices to determine when payments are 
made. Some justify these formulas on the 
basis that farmers need to be protected 
from long-lasting declines in price; 
however, low prices signal that the world 
has abundant supplies. Buffering farmers 
from this market signal simply prolongs 
low-price periods.
The crop insurance program offers 
an alternative way of buffering farmers 
from ϐinancial stress. Although it is 
easy to identify changes to the program 
that would make it more efϐicient, 
the program’s overall structure has a 
number of positive attributes. Program 
guarantees adjust each year to pre-
planting time market price levels, so 
only unexpected declines in market 
prices or yields trigger payments. A 
minimum 15 percent deductible means 
that revenue must decline below 
expected levels before a payment is 
received. Lastly, although premiums 
are heavily subsidized, at least farmers 
must pay a portion of the cost of the 
program so years in which they do not 
receive a crop insurance indemnity, 
they end up sending their crop 
insurance company a payment.
The likelihood of Congress tilting 
their funding decisions away from 
redistributive commodity programs 
that beneϐit a small group of farmers 
towards programs that serve the 
public may not be zero, but it is close 
to it. This low likelihood reϐlects 
both the strength of the status quo in 
determining policy directions as well 
as the strength of the lobbying efforts 
that support redistribution. However, 
the recent House action cutting $840 
billion over 10 years from the Medicaid 
program demonstrates that status 
quo redistributive programs may not 
always win out. Whether a willingness 
to cut a redistributive program 
that beneϐits poor people augers a 
willingness to cut redistribution to 
relatively wealthy and high-income 
farmers will soon be seen.  
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 1This calculation makes two assumptions: 
(a) the average land value and cash rent 
value from ISU surveys is used as proxy 
for gross income and asset/collateral 
value; and (b) it assumes certain loan-
to-value ratios based on regulations on 
agricultural lending and common lending 
practices, which we will discuss more in 
detail in Reason 3.
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agreements; and agriculture is one 
area that has deϐinitely beneϐitted from 
more open trade brought about by trade 
agreements and an area where the 
United States has traditionally enjoyed 
trade surpluses. 
Figure 1 shows the historical 
growth in US agricultural trade and 
the timing of these trade agreements. 
One thing to remember about most of 
the agreements is that the provisions 
are typically slowly rolled in over a 
number of years. For example, NAFTA 
was signed in 1994, but was not fully 
in effect until 2008. Agricultural trade 
was relatively small prior to the early 
1970s. The development of global 
agricultural trade in the mid-1970s 
boosted farm prices—agricultural 
trade values quadrupled during the 
decade. The impact of the 1980s farm 
crisis can be seen in the trade ϐlows as 
well. It was in the depths of that crisis 
that the United States signed its ϐirst 
free trade agreement with Israel in 
1985. NAFTA was agreed to in 1994. In 
the early 2000s, there was a ϐlurry of 
activity with multiple trade agreements 
being consummated. The latest set of 
agreements, with Colombia, Panama, 
and South Korea, were signed in 2012.
 Since the time of that ϐirst trade 
agreement, US agricultural exports have 
grown from $30 billion to the current 
total of $135 billion. Agricultural 
imports have grown as well, but not as 
quickly, moving from $20 billion in 1985 
to $115 billion in 2016. To highlight the 
impacts the free trade agreements have, 
Figure 2 breaks down US agricultural 
exports by partners (free trade 
agreement [FTA], China, and other non-
FTA). As the ϐigure shows, much of the 
growth in US agricultural exports has 
occurred with our free trade partners, 
with Canada and Mexico representing 
a substantial portion of that growth. 
Since 1985, US agricultural exports have 
averaged a 29 percent growth rate with 
our FTA partners. Over the same period, 
our agricultural exports have averaged 
a 7 percent growth rate with non-FTA 
countries, including China. Removing 
China from the non-FTA list slows the 
annual export growth rate to 5 percent.
More open and free trade has 
beneϐitted US agriculture, while it is 
not the only driver in export growth, 
as the growth in the US-China trade 
exhibits, it is a very signiϐicant factor, 
which makes sense from an economic 
perspective. Economic theory in 
trade outlines the idea of comparative 
advantage, the ability for an entity to 
produce a good or service at a lower 
cost than other entities competing 
with it. Different countries will have 
different products where they have 
a comparative advantage. Given the 
dispersion of comparative advantage 
across countries and products, trade can 
be mutually beneϐicial to all countries 
Ag Trade and Trade Agreements
continued from page 6
Figure 2. US Ag Exports 
Source: USDA-FAS
Figure 1. Value of US Agricultural Trade 
Source: USDA-FAS
Table 1. Countries with Trade Agreements with the United States 
Source: USDA-FAS  
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involved. Tariffs, border taxes, and other 
trade-restricting policies distort cost 
structures and thus, distort comparative 
advantages and trade ϐlows.
In the case of agriculture, the 
United States has a comparative 
advantage. We are the world’s largest 
producer of many agricultural products 
and have developed signiϐicant 
resources to transport our agricultural 
products throughout the country and 
around the world. Compared to other 
countries in the world, the United 
States is a high production, low cost 
source of agricultural products. As 
the ϐigures show, the removal of trade 
barriers, such as tariffs, via free trade 
agreements provides an economic 
boost to US agriculture.
Many of our agricultural products 
now rely on international demand as 
a major component of total demand. 
For the major Iowa crops, exports 
for the 2016/17 crops consume 15 
percent of US corn and 48 percent of 
US soybeans. However, other crops are 
just as, if not more, reliant on exports. 
Forty-ϐive percent of the US wheat crop 
is exported, along with 47 percent of 
US sorghum, 51 percent of US rice, and 
84 percent of US cotton. International 
trade is also important to the livestock 
and dairy industries. Twenty-one 
percent of all US pork is shipped to 
other countries, along with 10 percent 
of US beef, 17 percent of US broilers, 9 
percent of US turkeys, and 22 percent of 
US dairy. US agricultural production has 
expanded to match the demand we see 
from the rest of the globe.
So the chatter about the 
renegotiation of trade agreements has 
concerned many in US agriculture. The 
industry does not want to lose the gains 
of the previous couple of decades. Much 
of the new administration’s discussion 
of trade has highlighted sectors of 
the economy where the United States 
arguably does not have a comparative 
advantage. However, as Secretary 
Perdue enters his new role, he has 
moved to highlight the importance of 
trade for US agriculture by creating a 
new position in USDA, Undersecretary 
for Trade. The question for agriculture 
going forward is how strong a voice will 
USDA have as new trade talks begin. 
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